On the Realizability of Worlds

AA Cavia, The Feral. 22.07.23.

P1. Computation has never been formal, it is ungrounded in the last instance, and this propels it to generate novel sites for thought.

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L0  ~(~Q·P)
L1  (R⊃~P)·(~R⊃Q)

GOAL 1  TRANSFORM L1 INTO L0
     GOAL 2  DELETE R FROM L1
          GOAL 3  APPLY R8 TO L1
               PRODUCES L2 R⊃~P

     GOAL 4  TRANSFORM L2 INTO L0
          GOAL 5  ADD Q TO L2
               REJECT

     GOAL 2
          GOAL 6  APPLY R8 TO L1
               PRODUCES L3  ~R⊃Q

     GOAL 7  TRANSFORM L3 INTO L0
          GOAL 8  ADD P TO L3
               REJECT

     GOAL 2
          GOAL 9  APPLY R7 TO L1
               GOAL 10  CHANGE CONNECTIVE TO V IN LEFT L1
                    GOAL 11  APPLY R6 TO LEFT L1
                         PRODUCES L4  (~R V ~P)·(~R⊃Q)

               GOAL 12  APPLY R7 TO L4
                    GOAL 13  CHANGE CONNECTIVE TO V IN RIGHT L4
                         GOAL 14  APPLY R6 TO RIGHT L4
                              PRODUCES L5  (~R V ~P)·(R V Q)

                    GOAL 15  APPLY R7 TO L5
                         GOAL 16  CHANGE SIGN OF LEFT RIGHT L5
                              GOAL 17  APPLY R6 TO RIGHT L5
                                   PRODUCES L6  (~R V ~P)·(~R⊃Q

                         GOAL 18  APPLY R7 TO L6
                              GOAL 19  CHANGE CONNECTIVE TO V
                                       IN RIGHT L6
                                   REJECT

                         GOAL 16
                              NOTHING MORE

                    GOAL 13
                         NOTHING MORE

               GOAL 10
                    NOTHING MORE
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P2. Neural computation issues a challenge to what Deleuze calls the “dogmatic” image of thought, conceived as an affinity for truth, which is the pre-supposition of Western philosophy.





Perceptron Mark 1, Frank Rosenblatt, Cornell University (1958)

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P3. Deep learning marks a historical shift from naive to critical conceptions of space. The intrinsic geometricity of computation compels it to embed concepts in topological spaces we can call sites.



Julije Knifer, MK-73 7, Meander Series (1973)

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P4. Deracination is the very condition of thought, it is what forces us to think beyond mere recognition. It follows that the self-estrangement of reason cannot be supervised.

Abraham Cruzvillegas, Autoconstrucción

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P5. The problem posed by a theory of interpretation offered as a means of grounding does not in itself imply a formal structure of language (Davidson) but rather the “open-ended nature of our language games” (Meredith Williams).

26. One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. For example, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to |13| moods, to numbers, etc. To repeat — naming is something like attaching a name tag to a thing. One can call this a preparation for the use of a word. But *what* is it a preparation *for*?

27. "We name things and then we can talk about them: can refer to them in talk." — As if what we did next were given with the mere act of naming. As if there were only one thing called "talking about things". Whereas in fact we do the most various things with our sentences. Think just of exclamations, with their completely different functions.

Water!
Away!
Ow!
Help!
Splendid!
No!

Are you still inclined to call these words "names of objects"?

P6. Semantic ascent and gradient descent are complementary movements. Convergence, invariance, and correspondence are the operations at play in our language games. Agreements and disputes yield truths only as a byproduct of these informal procedures.

Yona Friedman, Mobile Architecture

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P7. Computation enacts a collapse of model and world. It casts intelligibility as the act of encoding a world model capable of realizing that world. Realizability is the only grounding available to computation as the coming together of logic and matter. It is the modal property common to intelligible form.



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